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One way to ensure tactical satellite systems
remain fully responsive to a field commander's
needs would be to place all command and
control' aspects of the system under direct
field control.
This paper presents the
results of a study to evaluate the feasibility
of field command of a notional tactical
imaging satellite system. The study indicates
that such a system is feaSible.
A satellite
constellation can be designed to provide the
field commander with significant, timely,
tactical data. The hardware is available, or
will be within the near term, that enables
field command and control facilities manned by
a team fully integrated into the existing
force struoture. Use of GPS receivers on the
spacecraft, greater satellite autonomy, and a
higher toleranoe for individual spacecraft
failures
can reduce
the work
load
on
ground-based controllers to manageable levelS.
However, field command will place constraints
on the amount of imagery that oan be obtained
due to limited data transmission times and
field commands with overlapping areas of
interest oompeting for system access.
kIn
addition
to
the
primary
authors,
significant
contributions were provided by Dave England,
Susie
Saalwaechter, and Jon sims of the Space Technology Division,
and Pat Bush of the Communications and Intelligence
Division.The views, opinions, and findings contained in this
report are those of the authors, and should not be construed
as an official ANSER pOSition, polioy, or decision.

INTltODOCTION

Great strides have been made in recent years in
miniatur-izing all aspects of satellite systems.
prototype
small satellites have been developed and demonstrated.
Launch vehicles optimized for small payloads are under
production. User equipment for many applications has been
miniaturized.
Special
purpose
command and
control
facilities are being prepared for several systems.
Few
studies have been done, however, to see how many aspects of
the system can be combined to produce a complete system that
would be respcnsive to a remote ccntrol site. We prepared
this study to estimate the feasibility of tactical satellite
field control.
We examined current telemetry, tracking, and control
(TT&C) schemes to identify the minimum elements necessary
for successful field satellite ccmmand.
The critical
element needed is greater satellite autonomy. Two potential
design enhancements that would reduce satellite dependency
on complex ground based control networks and thus, improve
spacecraft autonomy are independent satellite navigation
systems
and
improved
fault
management
systems.
Additionally, mobile field command and control components
were studied and two possible versions using currently
available or near term hardware assets are presented.
A tactical satellite system is useless if it does not
provide data in a timely manner to the battlefield
commander. This study investigated the time lines needed to
generate satellite tasking at the field level, the ability
to receive significant data during the limited pass times,
and the impact of multiple users competing for access to the
system.
We used a notional tactical imaging satellite system
developed in earlier studies as our baseline. This system
was comprised of a constellation of satellites at 500 km
altitude, with a 700 km swath width.
GltOUND SUPPORT CAN BE KINIKIZED

Complex ground facilities are presently used for
spacecraft
tracking.
navigation
updates.
telemetry
interpretation, fault management, and mission tasking. This
elaborate command and control structure is manpower
intensive
and
requires
large,
globally
distributed
facilities and antennas.
Clearly this infrastructure and
approach is not acceptable to a battlefield tactical
satellite commander. To minimize ground control, satellites
with more autonomy are needed. Autonomous satellites must
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be able to manage the day-to-day housekeeping functions,
correct detected faults,
and independently determine
posl tion and orientation.
Autonomous housekeeping is becoming fairly routine for
many of today' 5 satellites.
Power management and thermal
control functions, as well as payload related activities
such as tape recorder conditioning and fine sensor gain

adjUstments are some examples of functions being performed
by newer satellites without ground interaction. There are,
however, longer term variations in housekeeping resulting
from gradual changes in the satellite's orbit and seasonal

changes in average sun angle and sunlit hours per day that
require resolution. These effects may be too difficult for
preprogrammed autonomous operation, but the impact on ground
requirements will be slight if adjUstments are required only
infrequently.
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On board fault management and anomaly resolution is a
key improvement needed to improve satellite autonomy. There
are generally three classes of anomalies: those that can be
anticipated and easily corrected (such as failure of primary
systems that have redundant back-up systems), those that can
be anticipated but require involved procedures to correct
(such as failure of a non- critical component that can be
worked around), and those true anomalies that do not fit any
anticipated failUre mode
(such as those caused by
single-event-upsets in a central processing unit).
The first class of events can be, and often is, managed
autonomously by current satellites, with a message down to
the control center informing the operators of the change.
The issue affecting development of field control of a
lightsat system is how much capability to resolve the other
two classes of events should be built into the satellite
versus how much capability should remain with the operator.
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Those anomalies that require compromising some aspect of
the satellite's mission Should be resolved on the ground,
while those that are transparent to the user should be
incorporated into a more sophisticated on-board fault
management scheme. When the perturbation is a true anomaly,
the most cost effective system solution is likely to be
shutting down that satellite. This "disposable" ccncept is
driVen by three constraints. First, the personnel training,
on-site references, and work area needed to aggressively
pursue anomalies would be extensive. Second, a field unit
will be too involved in collecting data and preparing orders
to be able to deal with complex problems affecting only one
part of the overall system.
Finally, bUilding an
infrastructure that would allow the field to hand-over
3

problem satellites to another entity would be expensive and
could jeopardize the field control concept.
The -last, but most significant, aspect of satellite
autonomy is satellite attitude control and navigation. An
autonomous navigation system and Attitude Determination and
Control System (ADACSj must compensate for or predict
changes in spacecraft position and attitude that oocur due
to forces on the spacecraft while in orbit.
Atmospheric
drag is the major oontributor to these orbital changes in
low earth orbit. ADACS exist, nearly in off-the-shelf form,
to maintain the proper satellite orientation.
Accurately
determining orbital position is, however, the main stumbling
block toward acheiving true satellite autonomy.
Several navigation methods are being examined by
satellite designers.
The best of these, employing GPS
receiVers, relies on external signals, but generates very
accurate ephemeris data.
Advanoed earth, moon, and sun
triangulation schemes for navigation do not require
externally generated inputs and alSO appear promising,
although these me'thods are not as accurate as GPs-based
systems.
The addition of GPS receivers on individual satellites
would significantly enhanoe satellite autonomy.
Each
satellite would be able to receive signals from the GPS
constellation and precisely determine its own pcsition,
ephemeris, and possibly attitude as well.
This would
eliminate dependency on the Air Force Satellite Control
Network to calculate exact orbital parameters and would be
the most important single step toward giving the tactical
commander scle contrcl over the satellite.
Off-the-shelf
space
qualified
GPS
receivers
are
currently available whiCh meet lightsat size and weight
restrictions.
Within
five
to
ten
years
several
manufaoturers plan to market single circuit card GPS
receivers for satellites. Which will allow the GPS system to
be included as an integral part of the satellite's command
and control module, further reducing total satellite size
and mass.
Relying on GPS signals for navigation doeS involve some
risk, however. GPS is an cuts ide signal source and thus the
satellite system would not be totally autonomous. This is
mitigated somewhat by the fact that i f the GPS system is
plaCed at risk during times of contlict, its inherent
redundancy and survivability ensures that derived positional
accuracy will degrade in a gradual manner •
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To summarize this section, several steps can be taken to
minimize ground station interactions with a small satellite
system. The satellite can be made more autonomous by taking
on the -navigation, housekeeping, and simple maintenance
responsibilities. The satellite and the ground controller
can share modest fault management activities.
In this
architecture, an indigenous capability for oomplex anomaly
resolution is not required and should not be instituted.
GROURO SUPPORT HARDWARE IS AVAILABLB

Field telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) sites must
be mobile and flexible enough to operate under a Wide range
of battlefield conditions.
Modular hardware currently
exists, or is under development, to build these field TT&C
units. We examined two implementation concepts. The first
would be able to conduct mission tasking and limited TT&C.
The second concept would expand the TT&C capability to
permit monitoring and maintenance of the spacecraft.
In
each case, we explored the ability to utiliZe planned
upgrades to existing military vehicle chassis and mobile van
concepts.
We assumed the facility would normally be located at the
corpS/Division level, that it would be integrated into the
contiguous command facilities, and that fuel, water, and
crew support would be available on site.
The mobile site with limited TT&C capabilities would be
designed to execute:
Mission related activities;
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Data commanding
Data receipt
Quick-look analysis
Data tranSfer to existing processing
and exploitation oenters
TT&C related activities:
Monitor aggregate spacecraft health
Evaluate quality of data downlink
Modest anomaly resolution via menu-driven
algorithms
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The mobile site with expanded TT&C capability would
perform all of the functions assigned to the limited site
and be able to execute:

Additional TT&C related activities:
Monitor payload and bus subsystem status
Initiate limited orbit station-keeping maneuvers
Conduct improved anomaly resolution
Figure 1 illustrates notional implementation concepts
for both versions. Each system could be compatible with the
new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.
The electronics,
hardware, and shelters/chassis are standard. Power would be
supplied by a very high speed, compact, turbine driven
generator. No enabling technologies are required.
The limited site could be fully contained within a 3D-foot
standard van or trailer. This would include an integral Sor X-band tracking antenna, the power generator, air
conditioning,
work space, chemical-biological-radiation
(CBR) change out area, and electronics. Alternatively, the
limited site could be packaged in a 20-foot van if a
conventional diesel power generator is towed and CBR
capability is reduced to sealed operation only.
The fully capable system would require additional
software, hardware (up to five Aircraft Transportable Racks
(ATR) widths), and more work table and reference area for
aggressive anomaly resolution.
In addition, it would be
provisioned for independent inital start up and limited
duration operation.
It could be fully contained within a
40-ft van or packaged in a 30-ft van if the power generatcr
is towed and CaR capability is reduced as in the limited
site version.
Either site would require three shifts of three people,
an
Operations
Mission
Controller,
a
communications
Specialist, and an Equipment Maintenance Specialist/BaCkUp
Operator.
The enhanced version would place a higher work
load on both the Mission Operator and Communicator.
In
addition, they would require a higher degree of systems
engineering competence to handle higher order anomaly
resolution.
TIXILY DATA CAN BB DBLIVERED

Unlike
other
tactical
assets
available
to
the
battlefield commander, a small imaging satellite system
would be confined to fixed orbits and may give onlY limited
coverage of desired target areas. Figure 2 Shows the extent
of the satellite control area {assuming a 500 km altitude
orbit and a 5 degree elevation angle) along with the
relative position and size of coverage circles for four
different ground target locations (assuming a 700 km swath
width for the imager and a range of 300 km from the command
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site to the center of the target area).
For perspective,
the areas are shown superimposed on the United States.
FigUre 3 shows the time lines associated with a typical
target pass. The satellite will enter the field of view of
the ground site 3 to 5 minutes before crossing into the
target area. It will spend up to 2 minutes over the target
area, with only 5 to 10 seconds to view a specific 30 to 60
km square target site. The satellite will then have 3 to 5
minutes to downlink the data.
If the data can be down1inked at 20 megabits per second
[typical for an X-band tracking antenna) a satellite would
be able to transmit twelve to twenty 30 kIn square, 5 rn
resolution images without data compression.
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Figure 4 illustrates the time lines associated with
mission tasking, both for a preplanned mission and for an
immediate request.
During preplanned missions, OOllection
management functions will require the longest lead times.
All requests will be Submitted through command channels and
proceed
through
the
normal
intelligence
collection
management process.
This process helps to formulate
detailed collection requirements into precise mission
tasking while ensuring the the required information does not
already exist and that the appropriate assets are used to
collect the data. The mission manager determines the need
fOr lightsat support.
The asset manager ccnducts mission
planning and coordination and directly tasks the ground
control assets. The asset manager could be located at Ccrps
or deployed in the field with the satellite ground support
equipment.
In either case the asset manager is the direct
link between satellite operation and mission management.
Immediate requests will be submitted directly to the asset
manager. The asset manager could consolidate the immediate
request with planned overflights or preempt missions. The
time line accuracy will depend on the work load at the Ccrps
level, . the priority of the imagery request,
and the
satellite availability.
The limited time aVailable to command and then collect
data from a satellite cculd be fUrther constrained if more
than one command center is deployed in a theater. Figure 5
shcws the extent cf the overlap for two command sites in a
European theater.
The widely varying geometries of
successive satellite passes would make it difficult to
arrange for a satellite's pass to be divided between the
command centers in discreet time blockS.
Three precedence
schemes that cculd be used include;

,

Allocate specific satellites to specific command
(This will limit the total passes available to any
one center)
centers~

Have a coordinating authority prioritize the
requests.
(This greatly inoreases the complexity of t h e
command lines and limits the local commander's flexibility.
It also runs the riSk of the coordinating authority taking
over the asset.)
Encode the requests with a priority and have the
satellite sort the requests and deliver acoording to a
n
optimization scheme resident in the satellite c e n t r a 1
processor.
(This increases the complexity of the satellite
software and runs the risk of the users
abusing
the
prioritizing scheme.)
To summarize this seotion, while contact times are
extremely limited, it is feasible that the satellite could
deliver near real time images to the field commander.
The
mission tasking can be accomplished at the field site.
Multiple users will complicate the satellite tasking, but
reasonable options exist to solve the precedence problem.
CORCLesrOR

We presented the results of a stUdy to evaluate the
feasibility of field command of a notional tactical imaging
satellite system. The study indicates that such a system is
feasible.
A satellite constellation can be designed to
provide the field commander with significant, timely,
tactical data. The hardware is available, or will be within
the near term, that enables field command and control
facilities manned by a team fully integrated into the
existing foroe structure. The use of GPS receivers on the
spacecraft,
greater satellite autonomy, and a higher
tolerance for individual spacecraft failures can reduce the
work load on ground-based oontrollers to manageable levels.
However, field command will place constraints on the amount
of imagery that can be obtained due to limited data
transmission times and field commands with overlapping areas
of interest competing for system access.
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